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Abstract—Software Defined Networking promises unprece-
dented flexibility and ease of network operations. While flexibility
is an important factor when leveraging advantages of a new
technology, critical infrastructure networks also have stringent
requirements on network robustness and control plane delays.
Robustness in the SDN control plane is realized by deploy-
ing multiple distributed controllers, formed into clusters for
durability and fast-failover purposes. However, the effect of the
controller clustering on the total system response time is not
well investigated in current literature. Hence, in this work we
provide a detailed analytical study of the distributed consensus
algorithm RAFT, implemented in OpenDaylight and ONOS SDN
controller platforms. In those controllers, RAFT implements the
data-store replication, leader election after controller failures and
controller state recovery on successful repairs. To evaluate its
performance, we introduce a framework for numerical analysis
of various SDN cluster organizations w.r.t. their response time
and availability metrics. We use Stochastic Activity Networks
for modeling the RAFT operations, failure injection and cluster
recovery processes, and using real-world experiments, we collect
the rate parameters to provide realistic inputs for a representative
cluster recovery model. We also show how a fast rejuvenation
mechanism for the treatment of failures induced by software
errors can minimize the total response time experienced by the
controller clients, while guaranteeing a higher system availability
in the long-term.
Keywords - performance analysis, stochastic activity net-
works, SDN, distributed control plane, RAFT, strong consis-
tency, fault tolerance, smart grid, OpenDaylight, ONOS
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and problem statement
In critical infrastructure, such as the utility [1], [2] and
automotive [3] domains, resilience of the communication
network is a necessary property and an important criterion
for adopting a new and disruptive network technology such
as Software Defined Networking (SDN). In single controller
SDN scenarios, unavailability of the controller leads to loss of
control and monitoring channels with the network devices and
hence a system instability. The loss of network control may
further result in production and power outages (smart grid [1])
or even life-threatening scenarios (dependable automotive [3]).
To address the resilience issues, SDN controllers can be
logically coupled into controller clusters, where each instance
of the controller, referred to as replica hereafter, is respon-
sible for managing a number of switches in the network.
A particular controller may exhibit its control only over the
switches to which it is assigned. In order to provide a fallback
solution in case of another controller’s failure, it also keeps
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track of the internal state information related to the switches
managed by other controllers. When a controller replica fails,
a different controller instance from the same cluster takes
over and resumes operation with some downtime. To keep
the backup replicas up-to-date w.r.t. the internal controller
state, controllers synchronize their state. Depending on the
consistency model which defines the ordering of synchro-
nization messages, the synchronization procedure imposes a
varying overhead on the control channel [4], [5]. The two
major controller platforms OpenDaylight [6] and ONOS [7]
implement the strong consistency model, which requires that
the update of a distributed state has been seen by the majority
of the cluster members before it is considered to be committed.
In a strongly consistent cluster, whenever an update request
is initialized by a cluster client at one of the controller replicas,
the receiving replica sends out the received request to the
current cluster leader. The leader is the controller instance
that orders all incoming state update requests, so as to allow
for a serialized history of updates and thus operational state
consistency at runtime. Following a state update at the leader,
the update is propagated using a consensus protocol to the
cluster replicas, and is committed to the data-store only after
the majority of replicas have agreed on the update.
A consensus algorithm ensures that all replicas always
decide on the same value (agreement), with the constraint that
only a value proposed by one of the replicas eventually be-
comes accepted after the synchronization procedure (integrity).
Google’s Chubby [8] is a distributed locking service whose
state-distribution and failure tolerance mechanism are based on
a variation of the Paxos consensus algorithm [9], [10]. Open-
Daylight and ONOS implement the more recent algorithm
RAFT [11]. Unlike Paxos, RAFT also provides for persistent
logging and state reconciliation for recovered replicas.
In addition to the availability concerns, critical infrastruc-
ture providers often have very stringent requirements on the
experienced control plane delay. For example, the smart grid is
a delay-sensitive infrastructure that requires techniques which
identify and react on any abnormal communication network
changes in a timely manner. If the detection and responses are
not made promptly, the grid may become inefficient or even
unstable and cause further catastrophic failures in the entire
network [2]. Events in the grid may require rapid reaction
from the network controller - i.e. rerouting in case of power
grid failures, expedited diagnostics and alarm handling [1].
Furthermore, network management systems in the 5G context
can require bounded configuration times when establishing
on-demand network services [4]. However, the frequently
deployed strong consistency model in a clustered SDN requires
that, prior to any operation in the SDN controller cluster, a
cluster-wide synchronization must occur. The response time of
such a control plane is hence dependent on parameters such
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2as the cluster size, controller placement, processing delays in
different system components and the failure vectors.
The clustered SDN controller solutions require estimations
of the worst-case response times and the expected availability
for arbitrary sets of configurations, before their deployment
can be considered in critical infrastructure networks. To our
best knowledge, no prior work has investigated these issues.
Hence, we fill the gap with an appropriate analytical study.
In the remainder of the introductory section, we give an
overview of our contributions. In Section II, we describe the
assumed multi-controller SDN architecture from the system
perspective. In the same section we specify the technique
of Stochastic Activity Networks-based (SAN) modeling and
outline the consensus algorithm RAFT. In Section III we
introduce and explain in detail the proposed SAN models for
response time, controller failure injection and cluster recovery
modeling. In Section IV we explain the evaluation methods
and parametrizations used to compute the results presented in
Section V. In Section VI we present existing work in the field
of distributed SDN control plane and consensus algorithms.
Section VII concludes the paper.
B. Our contribution
In this paper, we present a system model of a distributed
SDN control plane that leverages the Stochastic Activity
Networks (SAN) modeling framework for the estimation of
cluster response time and availability measures. Our SANs
comprise the detailed sub-models of the RAFT consensus
algorithm, cluster failure and recovery. We also define the
parametrizations (studies) for different cluster configurations
in order to evaluate the introduced models. We further evaluate
a steady-state configuration of the distributed SDN control
plane using long-term failure rates for SDN controllers at sub-
module, process and hardware level, and short-term response
times experienced after immediate controller failures.
By assuming reliable event delivery and bounded network,
application and data-store commit delays, we can provide
stochastic delay guarantees for response handling times in
non-failure, partial-failure and cluster-majority failure states.
Failures are modeled as stochastic arrival processes for long-
term, and deterministic occurrences for worst-case evaluations.
As per the nature of the modeled consensus algorithm RAFT,
the recovery process too is a combination of stochastic and
deterministic message and timeout delays. We further intro-
duce an enhancement to the current controller platforms for
enabling a fast recovery of controller bundles and processes.
We evaluate its benefits w.r.t. to the total expected response
time and cluster availability using the developed model. Our
SAN models are compiled into Continuous Time Markov
Chain (CTMC) state spaces. In contrast to existing works on
consensus algorithms that derive their performance analysis
from experiments, we provide analytical guarantees. To this
end, our numerical solutions cover the space of all possible
state combinations which an SDN cluster may be in.
II. SYSTEM MODEL, SAN PERFORMABILITY MODELING
AND THE RAFT CONSENSUS ALGORITHM
In this section, we introduce the assumed system model that
comprises the forwarding devices, multiple SDN controllers
for redundancy and controller clients. We then outline the
background on the formal concepts used in our modeling
and discuss the evaluated RAFT consensus algorithm in more
detail. The notation used henceforth is presented in Table I.
TABLE I
NOTATION USED IN SECTIONS II AND III. THE REMAINING MODEL
PARAMETERS ARE SPECIFIED IN TABLE II.
Symbol Parameter
C Number of SDN controller cluster replicas
F or NF Controller failure count
pi(t) State probability vector at time t
q Uniformization rate constant of the CTMC
TR RAFT replica-to-leader network delay
TM Actual follower-majority-to-leader network delay
TMworst Worst-case follower-majority-to-leader network delay
TMbest Best-case follower-majority-to-leader network delay
RM Number of missing RAFT terms in a lagging follower
FSf Boolean depicting a failure of a single RAFT follower
FMj Boolean depicting a failure of the RAFT follower majority
FLdr Boolean depicting a failure of the RAFT leader
LUp Counter of currently available RAFT leaders
FUp Counter of currently available RAFT followers
A. Generic system model
We assume a set of C SDN controllers, collected in a
single cluster and deployed for the purpose of achieving fault-
tolerant operation [5]. Fig. 1 depicts a deployment of the
redundant control- and data planes in an exemplary industrial
SDN network. Control plane redundancy is realized by running
C = 3 controllers simultaneously, and a number of disjoint
paths in between them for fail-over purposes in case of link
and node outages. In general, a deployment of C = 2 ∗F +1
controllers tolerates a maximum of F controller failures before
the SDN cluster becomes unavailable. Thus, in Fig. 1 only a
single controller failure is tolerated before the cluster stops to
serve the clients’ requests (consult the explanation below). The
clients of the controllers, such as the network administrators,
switches, network appliances and end-hosts, can trigger con-
troller events that lead to a cluster-wide state synchronization
and subsequent event processing in the cluster leader. Clients
communicate their requests (i.e. Remote Procedure Calls, state
updates, topology events etc.) to any live replica that is a
member of the SDN cluster. The replica then contacts their
current cluster leader to serialize (order) the request, which
in return distributes the request to other replicas, commits the
request and executes its local state machine (in zero-failure
case). The replica is then notified of the result of the request
execution and can respond to the client with an application
response. In the case of a leader failure during the request
processing, a new leader is elected by executing a consensus
algorithm and the synchronization process is re-initiated.
The limitation of supporting only F failures when 2∗F +1
replicas are deployed relates to the CAP theorem [12]. This
theorem states that any distributed system can provide a
maximum of two of the following three system properties at
the same time: consistency, availability and partition-tolerance
(CAP). Consensus algorithms such as RAFT [11] and Paxos
[9], [13] favor consistency and partition-tolerance properties,
and are able to forward their state consistently even in the face
of network partitions. A consistent operation of a controller
cluster ensures that the majority of controllers will have the
same controller state at any given time, and that no two
3conflicting state updates are ever successfully committed to
the shared update history. Hence, controllers are in consensus
with regards to their state. Consistent and partition-tolerant
operation, however, comes at the cost of a lower availability,
since consistent operation in the face of network partitions can
only be guaranteed by disabling the operation of a partitioned
cluster minority while the majority continues to operate. In
the remainder of the paper we take this limitation into account
and consider the system as available only when the majority
of controller nodes are available and are mutually reachable.
Application Domain Control Network
C1
(RAFT 1)
C2
(RAFT 2)
C3
(RAFT 3)
NBI
Client
Fig. 1. An exemplary industrial SDN with redundant paths for majority
of controller-to-controller and controller-to-switch connections. The SDN
controllers execute the RAFT [14] agents, responsible for per-state-shard state
synchronization, leader election and cluster recovery after individual replica
failures. Red dashed lines represent the RAFT session exchanges between
the SDN controller replicas, blue dashed lines are the ”client” connections
(switch-controllers, northbound interface client-controllers).
In state of the art controller platform implementations with
a strong consistency model [6], [7], network configuration re-
quests facilitate a number of state changes and inter-controller
synchronization steps before coming to a consensus in de-
cision and actual execution of the configuration change. For
example, assuming an SDN module that subscribes and reacts
to topology changes (e.g., raises alarms to an administrator in
case of link failures), the topology change would first need
to be committed across the majority of controllers, before the
subscribed SDN module could be notified of the committed
change and execute the reaction. The duration of this process
obviously depends on the cluster size, the availability of
controllers and the controller-to-controller delays.
In the following subsections we describe the SAN frame-
work we use for modeling of the distributed SDN control
plane. We give an overview of the RAFT consensus algorithm
responsible for state synchronization, cluster leader election
and state recovery after failures.
B. Stochastic Activity Networks
In contrast to previously eublished methods on the evalua-
tion that provides a mean to evaluate an existing product or
deployment, e.g. by using measurement techniques, deductive
analysis allows for a system evaluation before the system is
actually deployed. Hence, significant savings can be achieved
if the deductive solutions are able to accurately predict the
real-world behavior of the future non-implemented system
or system extensions. With this in mind, contrary to the
previously published methods on evaluation of the distributed
SDN control plane, which base their analysis on a limited
number of physical cluster configurations [15], [16], we opt
for the flexible and economical deductive solution.
Discrete-event simulation is, for example, partially applica-
ble to our problem. Simulation allows for a tunable quality
of the results by repeating execution of a given model and
derivation of the relevant output measures. However, the
simulation methodology may not handle corner cases, which
are numerous in a consensus algorithm such as RAFT.
Another class of deductive analysis methods are the analytic
numerical methods, which are suitable when a closed-form
solution is not obtainable. Analytic numerical solvers allow
for an accurate evaluation of each system state configuration.
For this purpose, they require a manually or automatically gen-
erated model state space as an input. The additional overhead
of the state space generation, as well as the inclusion of each
state in the solution, generally leads to a higher computational
effort compared to simulation. Furthermore, the generation
of the state space may lead to a state explosion problem
and infeasible solving times. Therefore, we dedicate Section
V-C to specifically discuss the scalability of our models.
Instead of the manual state modeling, we automate the model
generation process and hence avoid the issue of largeness [17]
of the resulting state space. For the purpose of the automated
model generation, we use the Stochastic Activity Networks
(SANs), one of the most prominent representatives of model
generation frameworks. We choose specifically SANs over
similar techniques, such as Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets
and Stochastic Reward Nets because of its practical extensions
for the inhibition of state transitions, as well as the flexible
predicate assignment to the gate abstractions (see below).
SANs are an extension of Petri Nets (PN) and an established
graphical language for describing the system behavior. SANs
have been successfully used in survivability and performability
studies of critical infrastructures [18], industrial control sys-
tems [19] and telecommunication systems [20] since the late
1980s. We provide a brief summary of the most important
SAN concepts used in our modeling here, and refer the more
interested reader to comprehensive descriptions in [17], [21].
A SAN consists of places, activities, input gates and output
gates. Similar to PNs, places have a certain token assignment
associated with them. Every unique assignment of tokens
across the places uniquely defines a state of the SAN. These
states are called markings. In Markov Chain analogy, a single
marking represents a unique state of a Markov Chain. An
activity element of a SAN defines a transition with the
corresponding transition rates, and allows for controlling the
flow of tokens from a single SAN place into a different SAN
place. Furthermore, an activity allows for connecting a place
to an output gate where, on transition of a token from a place
to an output gate, a sequence of actions can be taken - e.g. ”if
the number of tokens in place A > n→ increment the number
of tokens in place B by m”. Hence, compact state changes (and
a large number of unique markings) triggered by a particular
transition may be modeled using a smaller number of modeling
elements, compared to a traditional Markov Chain.
When an activity fires, a number of tokens are removed
from the source place and transferred to a destination place
connected by the activity. An input gate serves as an inhibitor
of an associated activity. It specifies a boolean predicate which,
when evaluated true, enables an activity and allows the firing
4of the activity. If the inhibitor evaluates false, the associated
activity is disabled. An instantaneous activity is enabled at all
times, and will fire whenever there are tokens available in its
input place. A timed activity, on the other hand, is assigned a
time distribution function which specifies the firing rate of a
specific activity. In our model, for timed activities we assign
the deterministic (Erlang-approximated) and exponential firing
rates, but also specify instantaneous activities where necessary.
An activity may further lead to a token transfer from a source
place to one of multiple destination places. This uncertainty
is modeled using a case definition for each destination state,
where each case is assigned a probability parameter.
To solve the SAN, it must first be transformed into a
discrete-state stochastic process [17]. We make use of the flat
state space generator implemented in the Mo¨bius modeling
tool [22], to generate the Continuous Time Markov Chain
(CTMC) state space inherent to the evaluated SAN. To derive
instantaneous state probabilities of a CTMC, the transient
solver of Mo¨bius implements the uniformization method [17],
[23]. In short, using uniformization, the transient state proba-
bility vector pi(t) of the CTMC can be expressed in terms of a
one-step probability matrix of a Discrete Time Markov Chain
(DTMC), so that all state transitions of a resulting DTMC
occur with a uniform rate q. As a result of the transformation,
the desired state probability vector pi(t) at time t is governed
by a Poisson variable qt and can be expressed as follows:
pi(t) ≈
i=r∑
i=l
v(i)e−qt
(qt)i
i!
where v(0) = pi(0) (1)
where v(i) represents an iteratively computed DTMC state
probability vector at step i. Lower and upper bounds, l and r,
govern the number of iterations required to compute the state
probability vector with an overall error tolerance of ε = εl+εr
and truncation points l and r, respectively.
C. Case Study: RAFT Consensus Algorithm
RAFT is a distributed consensus algorithm that provides
safe and ordered updates in a system comprised of multiple
running replicas. RAFT is the only consensus algorithm imple-
mentation in the two prominent open-source SDN controller
platforms OpenDaylight [6] and ONOS [7]. It tries to solve the
issues of understandability of the previous de-facto standard
consensus algorithm Multi-Paxos [9], and additionally stan-
dardizes an implementation of leader election and post-failure
replica recovery operations. A comprehensive description of
the algorithm can be found in [11], [14].
A RAFT cluster comprises leader, follower and candidate
replica roles. The leader is the node that parses and distributes
incoming client updates (i.e. reads, writes, no-ops) to RAFT
followers and ensures safe commits. The majority of cluster
followers must confirm the acceptance of a new update before
the leader and the followers may commit the update in
the local commit log. Only after the update is committed,
the SDN applications built on top of a RAFT agent can
continue their processing. After the application has computed
the operation related to state update, a response is forwarded
to a client (e.g., a switch or network management system).
RAFT guarantees that the applied state updates are eventually
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Fig. 2. A simplified lifecycle schema of a replica inside the RAFT cluster.
Adapted from [14] and extended for the purpose of detailed modeling.
committed in every available replica in the cluster in the
right order. Furthermore, each update is applied exactly once,
hence enabling linearizable semantics [14] when operating
with the controller state. In the case of a leader failure, after
an expiration of an internal follower timeout, the remaining
followers automatically switch to a candidate role. A candidate
is an active replica which offers to become the new cluster
leader. To do so, it propagates its candidate status to the other
available replicas. If a majority of nodes vote for the same
candidate, this candidate node becomes the new leader.
Updates in RAFT require a single-round trip delay between
the leader and the preferred follower majority (the fastest to
reach followers). When a controller failure occurs, depending
on the role of the failed replica, additional delay overhead is
imposed. Failures in the RAFT leader during the processing
of a particular update lead to a new leader election after an
expired election timeout. After an exceeded client timeout, the
client retries its request. If instead of the leader a follower
had failed, depending on the follower’s type and the number
of active followers, we distinguish three scenarios:
• Failure of a follower that is not a member of the preferred
follower majority results in no additional imposed delays
between the leader and the cluster majority.
• Failure of a follower that is a member of the preferred
follower majority leads to the RAFT leader having to
include an additional ”slower” follower in the preferred
follower majority. This, in return, may negatively affect
the update commit times depending on the follower’s
placement and its distance to the RAFT leader.
• Failure of any follower that comprises the follower set,
with no backup followers available (stand-by RAFT
members), necessarily leads to the cluster unavailability.
The client update requests that were not successfully
committed must be repeated by the client.
After a successful recovery of the majority of the RAFT
members and the re-election of a new leader, RAFT is able
to forward its state and commit new updates. Depending on
the failure source and the repair time, as well as on the
RAFT recovery parameters (candidate and election timeout),
the recovery takes a non-deterministic period to finish.
5Fig. 2 gives a high-level overview of the states a cluster
replica may traverse throughout its lifecycle. We present the
more detailed structural and behavioral models of RAFT in
zero- and multiple-failure cases in Section III. Section IV
details the timing variables used in our parametrization of
RAFT.
III. SAN MODELS
In this section, we present the SAN models for response
time, failure and recovery processes in the context of a RAFT-
enabled SDN control plane. We represent places as blue cir-
cles, timed activities as thick blue vertical bars, instantaneous
activities as thin blue vertical bars, and input and output gates
as thick red and black arrows, respectively.
A. RAFT End-to-End Delay SAN Model
The distributed SDN control plane model assumes C con-
trollers connected in a RAFT cluster, hosting one or multiple
SDN applications (referred to as bundles) that react to asyn-
chronous client events. The client device is external to the
SDN controller (e.g. an OpenFlow switch or a northbound
interface consumer). The client sporadically generates events,
such as flow requests or switch notifications which neces-
sitate data-store updates and its subsequent synchronization.
The client delivers these events in asynchronous and reliable
manner to the replicas in the cluster for processing. After the
controller cluster finishes the event processing, the client is
notified of the result. The SAN in Fig. 3 depicts this process.
The place IdleState models the initial system state
where no events are queued for internal processing. Following
a new event arrival at any of the RAFT replicas, the receiving
replica is tasked with the propagation of the new event
to the current RAFT leader. New event arrivals increment
the token amount in the state EventQueuedForLeader,
where events are queued until a leader controller replica
becomes elected in the cluster. The input gates enumerated
LeaderAndMajorityUp# ensure that the transmission of
the event to the RAFT leader or replicas, as well as the
intermediate processing inside the cluster happens only in the
case where both the RAFT leader and the follower majority
are up and available in the cluster. Propagation of the event
from the furthest-away replica to the leader is modeled by
the activity delayToLeader using a deterministic worst-
case delay metric TR = TMworst (see below). On a re-
ceived event, the leader initiates the propagation of the re-
spective data-store state update to its followers. The delays
induced by the activities delayToMajorityFollowers
and delayFromMajorityToLeader correspond, in the
best-case to the leader-to-(preferred)-majority delay TMbest .
In the worst-case, to contact the follower majority, the leader
needs to contact the follower furthest away from it and hence
induce the worst-case uni-directional network delay TMworst .
Thus, the delay between the RAFT leader and the follower
majority is governed by the number of failed followers. We
model the non-constant leader-follower majority delay TM as
detailed below. When the follower majority has acknowledged
the state update, the leader continues committing the data-
store change locally, and the system eventually reaches the
CommitDone state. To prevent the leader from broadcast-
ing multiple unacknowledged updates, we ensure the input
gate DisableConcurrentUpdates enables the transition
delayToMajorityFollowers if and only if the distribu-
tion states of RAFT do not contain any outstanding tokens (no
synchronization in progress).
Alternatively, in the case of at least one replica that neces-
sarily comprises the cluster majority lags behind the RAFT
leader in terms of its commit log (see Subsection II-C),
the leader enforces additional steps in order to synchronize
the cluster majority with its local view. To this end, the
activity majorFollowerNotUpToDate fires and a token
is incremented in the place BringFollowersUpToDate.
The lagging followers are thus assigned the Follower
(Lagging) node status (depicted in Fig. 2). For each
RAFT term state that is missing in the lagging follower, an
additional round-trip delay in the critical path between the
leader and replica is induced, hence adding 2 · RM ∗ TM
to the overall delay, where RM is the maximum number of
missing RAFT terms in the follower. This delay is imposed in
the definition of the activity lateBringUpToDateNodes.
To govern the activation of the instantaneous activity
majorFollowerNotUpToDate we make use of a stateful
counter CounterFailures that is incremented on each
new logged replica failure (refer to Subsection III-B). We
consider the worst-case and hence assume that at any time
after b(C − 1)/2c+ 1 replica nodes have been disabled, out-
of-date replicas are automatically present in the majority of the
follower nodes required to confirm a leader update. Hence,
we infer the additional overhead of updating the lagging
nodes in the replica majority. The flag to enable the activity
majorFollowerNotUpToDate is cleared after the recon-
ciliation (as a side configuration of the gate resetCounter).
Following an applied data-store commit in the majority of
replicas, the leader commits the state locally and the SDN
application gets notified of the data-store event. The data-store
commit and the SDN application’s processing delay are in-
duced during the activity applyCommit and are modeled as
TC and TA in Table II, respectively. After the application has
completed its processing (system state ApplicationDone),
the leader notifies the replica that initially generated the update
event (thus adding once-more TR to the overall worst-case
delay), and the replica further forwards its response to the
client (thus adding TCR which is the client-replica delay). The
system then finally reaches the stable state SequenceEnd,
where the event is marked as successfully processed. In case
of a failure occurrence in the leader or follower majority
during the event processing, the activities named CH# lead
to a token being shifted from the current SAN place to
the EventQueuedForLeader place, using the output gate
increment action modeled by OGF#. Hence, the event distribu-
tion procedure restarts as soon as the cluster is re-established.
The delay until a critical failure occurrence of the leader or
the follower majority is noticed by the client is modeled using
the client timeout TCL.
As previously noted, the delay from the RAFT leader to
the furthest-away replica from the follower majority will vary
depending on the availability and proximity of followers w.r.t.
6Fig. 3. The RAFT response time model depicting the sub-processes of: the receival of a client event at a follower proxy-replica; the event propagation to the
RAFT leader; the event propagation from the leader to the follower majority; the data-store commit of the client event and its subsequent processing in the
SDN application; and ultimately the propagation of the SDN application’s response from leader, through the proxy-replica, to client. Detecting a failure of the
RAFT follower majority or leader leads to the restart of the event handling process, starting at the place EventQueuedForLeader - but only after an added
deterministic delay of client timeout (see Table II). Furthermore, the extended sub-process of AppendEntries RPC, necessary to reconcile the RAFT followers
that lag behind the current RAFT leader in terms of their state, is included in the lower right part of the critical path (state BringFollowersUpToDate).
the current cluster leader. We annotate the leader-majority
followers delay as TM . Assuming a deployment of C con-
troller nodes and a single leader L at any time, the set
SL = {DR1, DR2...DRbC/2c} contains the maximum bounded
delays between the leader L and bC/2c follower nodes closest
to L w.r.t. delay between controller L and each of the available
followers RI . Hence, we define the delay between leader L
and the follower majority as the delay between L and the
farthest follower in the majority TM = max{SL}.
To emphasize the effect of a failed preferred-follower con-
troller on the response time, in our exemplary evaluation,
we scale the delay value to contact the followers majority
linearly with the number of currently available followers using
a scaling factor SF so that:
TM =
{
SF ∗ TMbest when Fup ≥ bC/2c
undefined otherwise
For the evaluation purposes we model the SF as a function
of the current marking of SAN so that SF = C−1Fup and thus:
TM =
{
C−1
Fup
∗ TMbest when Fup ≥ bC/2c
undefined otherwise
where Fup represents the number of currently available fol-
lowers. In the best case where all nodes are up, the leader-
majority delay equals TMbest . In the worst case, the controller-
majority delay peaks at TMworst = TR = 2∗TMbest when only
bC/2c+ 1 controller nodes (including the leader) are active.
Using a fixed scaling factor is an exemplary and non-optimal
representation, as the exact worst-case leader-majority delay
is equal to the delay between the leader and the farthest
away follower in the current follower majority, and hence
necessitates knowing the exact bounded delays between each
two SDN controllers in the network. We omit this level of
model granularity as the required parameters would require
population from an engineered network topology, and would
further rely on the optimality of the used controller placement
technique. Nevertheless, the SAN model proposed here can
be extended to take an arbitrary set of controller-to-controller
delay parameters with little effort.
Data-store sharding: The data-store of an SDN controller
(e.g., OpenDaylight) is sharded into an arbitrary amount of
data shards at a flexible granularity (e.g., data shard for topol-
ogy or flow state). Separate RAFT sessions are responsible for
each data shard. We assume that all data shards are available
on all SDN controller replicas. Hence, each available controller
is an active member of each per-shard RAFT session. RAFT
can handle the updates of different data shards concurrently
and in isolation. This enhances the overall throughput of the
system as multiple asynchronous updates to different shards
are parallelized and executed in a non-blocking manner.
Batching of the data-store updates and latency considera-
tions: We assume that the clients specify their updates that
modify a shard either as a single state update or as a batch
of updates [24] for maximized throughput and minimized
response time. Thus, the worst-case occurs when the update or
a batch of concurrent updates is exchanged in a single frame
across the cluster and the majority of the cluster members fail
before the updates are committed successfully. If a new update
arrives during the processing of another update of the same
shard and a leader fails, we assume that the client updates are
in the worst-case batched with the previous non-committed
updates and are transferred in one round after the cluster has
recovered. This model is fitting for handling real-time events
(e.g., alarms) that should preferably never get queued.
B. Cluster Failure SAN Model
To evaluate the performance of the SDN distributed control
plane and RAFT in the face of failures, we introduce a
7dedicated failure model. For general long-term considerations,
we distinguish between hardware and software failures with
failure rates λFH and λFS , respectively. All specified non-
deterministic timeouts, failure and repair rates in our model
follow a negative exponential distribution. For software fail-
ures, we distinguish failures at the application bundle (i.e. an
OSGI bundle in ONOS [7] and OpenDaylight [6] controllers)
and process level failures. Similarly, repair rates are distin-
guished correspondingly as specified in Table II.
The SAN failure model is depicted in Fig. 4. The place
NodesUp contains the total number of available controllers
(nodes that are up, but not necessarily assigned a RAFT
member role). Depending on the failure type (at hardware,
process or bundle level), after an occurrence of a failure, a
token is placed into the respective NodesDown place. Further-
more, each firing of a failure activity triggers a token addition
in the place NodeDownSelectFailure and results in
a subsequent evaluation in the instantaneous case activity
failureSelectRole. We distinguish between the safe-
follower (FSf ), follower-majority (FMj) and leader failures
(FLdr), with the following probabilities:
P (FSf ) =
{ Fup
Fup+1
when Fup ≥ d(C − 1)/2 + 1e ∧ Lup > 0
0 otherwise
P (FMj) =
{
1 when Fup < d(C − 1)/2 + 1e ∨ Lup == 0
0 otherwise
P (FLdr) =
{
1
Fup+1
when Fup ≥ d(C − 1)/2 + 1e ∧ Lup > 0
0 otherwise
where Fup and Lup are the counters of tokens in places
FollowersUp and LeaderUp before the failure occur-
rence, respectively. Failure of the follower-majority FMj , or
a leader failure FLdr during the event handling in controller,
results in a client timeout and subsequent restart of the event
handling process. On the other hand, failure FSf does not
affect the cluster availability as the reorganization of a stable
cluster majority is still possible with the remaining nodes,
albeit with an added delay (as per the definition of TM ).
Fig. 4. The SAN model of the failure processes includes the long-term
failure rates (Hw_F, Process_F and Bundle_F) and the controlled
failure injection (Inj_Hw_F, Inj_Process_F and Inj_Bundle_F).
The failure type is decided based on a random selection process (bottom-
left), and its severity is a function of the current system state (bottom-right).
In order to observe the response time during and shortly af-
ter the failure, we also model a procedure for controlled failure
injection of single and multiple-correlated transient controller
failures and observe the system performance over a short-
term time range at millisecond granularity. The correlated
failures are modeled as bursty and may occur concurrently.
In the past, correlated failures have been investigated in the
context of distributed systems [25], and represent a flexible
method to consider chained failure propagation, i.e. resulting
from a malfunctioning replicated SDN application. The failure
injection process is depicted in the upper left part of the
SAN shown in Fig. 4. The place BurstyFailureTokens
initially holds a number of tokens corresponding to the num-
ber of simultaneous bursty failure injections. The activity
selectFailureType governs the probability distributions
for encountering a particular type of node failure.
As will be shown in the Subsection V-A, in our response
time evaluation we distinguish the scenarios of mixed hard-
ware and software failure injection, as well as the single and
multiple-correlated failure injections at the granular level of
controller bundle, controller process or hardware.
Critical data plane failures: In a DTMC, the probability
of occurrence of an SDN controller element failure Fc or a
critical data plane element failure Fd corresponds to:
P (Fc ∩ Fd) = P (Fc) + P (Fd)− P (Fc ∪ Fd) (2)
In the continuous time domain, failure arrivals for the crit-
ical data plane elements that carry the controller-to-controller
flows, and failure arrivals for the SDN controller elements can
be represented as two independent Poisson processes Nd(t)
and Nc(t) with the unique firing rates λd and λc, respectively.
Since the two processes are independent, they also have
independent increments. Therefore, critical failure arrivals
associated with the summed process Nt(t) = Nd(t) + Nc(t)
can be modeled using the rate λt = λd + λc.
The failure rates for the critical data plane paths which
carry the network control flows can be embedded in the
parametrization of our models without an additional modeling
overhead (see Table II). However, in this work we primarily
focus on studying the control plane consensus for the use case
of a highly redundant industrial network [26], [27]. Thus, we
intentionally decouple our work from the data plane reliability
studies and assume the reliable parametrization 1/λd =∞.
C. RAFT Recovery SAN Model
The RAFT recovery SAN model in Fig. 5 depicts the
process of re-inclusion of a previously disabled controller
replica in the RAFT cluster. The place InitElectionPool
holds a token for each running controller replica that is
available but still needs to be admitted in the cluster. As
per RAFT design, the replica expects the RAFT leader of
the current term to announce its presence using a leader
heartbeat. If a leader is identified before the follower time-
out expires, the replica takes upon the follower role and a
token is assigned to the place AnnounceFollowerRole.
Alternatively, the replica switches to the candidate role (place
AnnounceCandidateRole). Three cases are now possi-
ble, each adding its specific delay to the overall response time:
1) If the cluster majority is up (≥ bC/2c+1) and the repli-
cas acknowledge the candidate as a new leader before
8the expiration of the candidate timeout, the candidate is
elected as the leader (output gate setLeaderUp). The
announcement of the candidate role from the candidate
to the cluster majority takes an additional round trip.
2) If another leader is identified while the replica
is in the candidate state, the candidate replica
becomes a follower and a token moves from
the AnnounceCandidateRole place to the
setNewFollowerUp output gate.
3) If the cluster majority sends no acknowledgment to the
candidate nodes during the candidate timeout (occurs
whenever a total of b(C/2)c+1 replicas are still down),
the candidate waits for the timeout to expire and then
repeats the candidate procedure.
Fig. 5. The RAFT recovery SAN model depicts the inclusion of a previously
unavailable controller replica into the cluster. Depending on the current state,
the replica may become either the new RAFT leader or a follower. Duration
of the recovery process will affect the resulting event response time and the
cluster availability if the recovering replica is needed to establish a follower-
majority and elect a new RAFT leader.
If the replica becomes a RAFT leader, a token is assigned
to the LeaderUp place (previously empty), alternatively the
token is assigned to the place FollowersUp. In both cases,
the NodesUp token counter is incremented by 1.
IV. EVALUATION
A. Model parametrization using a RAFT experiment
To evaluate the general fitness of our response time model,
we first compare the proposed model against an experimental
RAFT setup in a zero-failure scenario. For this purpose, we
implement a RAFT agent and deploy multiple copies thereof
in a RAFT cluster. For the RAFT backend implementation, we
use the open-source Java library libraft 1. The cluster was orga-
nized so that the controller nodes, acting as RAFT agents, were
reachable in an any-to-any manner over a single-hop Open
vSwitch instance. We configured the Open vSwitch to inject a
constant symmetrical delay of 5ms on each egress port and we
then used this value as a deterministic base leader-follower-
majority delay TM in the model parametrization. Furthermore,
based on the raftlib performance observations, we modeled the
commit delay parameter TA as an exponentially distributed
delay with a mean of 1ms. The resulting modeled response
time and the comparison with the experimental results for
different controller cluster sizes are depicted in Fig. 6. As can
be noted, our model predicts the expected performance well.
To reflect the stochastic performance guarantees when replica
failures are concerned, we resort to using only SAN-based
analytical modeling for most accurate approximations.
B. Fast recovery mechanism for bundles and processes
In contrast to evaluating the system with purely fixed
software repair rates, as was done in relevant past studies [28],
1libraft - Raft Distributed Consensus Protocol in Java: https://libraft.io
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Fig. 6. Comparison of experimentally observed and modeled RAFT per-
formance with clusters of various sizes. Represented are the CDFs of per-
cluster-configuration measurements, with each measurement encompassing
1000 sequential write operations. The observed delay considers a fixed single-
hop packet latency of 5ms in between the RAFT leader and replicas, as well
as a 1ms data-store commit time in the RAFT leader and replica majority.
Client and application delays were not considered in this experiment. The
measurements were taken in a zero-failure state of the RAFT cluster and
should serve as an initial indicator of the response time model fitness.
[29], we utilize a recovery model that reflects much closer
the actual state-of-the-art SDN controller implementations. We
further propose an optimization to enhance upon the standard
repair time in the face of controller failures. We assume a
watchdog-like mechanism implementation that monitors the
critical controller components’ health and correctness. The
watchdog can monitor both the granular SDN controller ap-
plications (bundles) and the actual controller process (that
comprises many bundles). Whenever a bundle or a process
fails, we assume an immediate scheduling of a rejuvenation
procedure that repairs the affected software component.
Realization: While there may exist various designs to realize
a watchdog functionality for the purpose of monitoring the
liveness of a software or hardware component, we opted
to implement the watchdog as a software-agent external to
the OSGi container hosting the SDN controller bundles. We
deployed the watchdog agent on the same host machine as
the monitored SDN controller instance. Following a successful
start-up of both the watchdog and the SDN controller pro-
cesses, the watchdog establishes a connection to the OSGi
environment hosting different controller bundles. We make
use of the Apache Karaf’s2 Remoting mechanism to allow for
remote connections to a running Karaf instance.
Our agent periodically polls the status of a bundle’s lifecycle
and discovers that the bundle is in one of the following UP
states: {INSTALLED, STARTING, ACTIVE}; or DOWN states:
{UNINSTALLED, STOPPING, RESOLVED}. Upon discovery
of a bundle that is in a DOWN-state, the agent schedules a
bundle:start-transition for the affected bundle, in order to get
it up and running in an UP-state. In the case of an unsuccessful
remote connection to Karaf, the watchdog evaluates the current
list of processes for false positives and, if a missing Karaf
process is detected, it schedules an immediate restart of Karaf.
The watchdog process could also be executed externally
to the machine running the SDN controller. Hence, while
not considered in our evaluation, the same mechanism can
2Apache Karaf - an OSGi distribution offered by the Apache Software
Foundation based on Apache Felix - https://karaf.apache.org
9be applied to schedule physical or VM reboots in case of a
hardware or hypervisor failure. On the other hand, hardware
or hypervisor issues may be a sign of misconfigurations or
recurring defects whose source should be diagnosed manually.
To collect the accurate real-world repair rates for controller
bundles and processes, we have used our watchdog agent
implementation to evaluate the bundle and process reboot
times in a clustered OpenDaylight (ODL) setup. We had
experimentally injected bundle- and process-critical failures
in sequence and then measured the subsequent recovery time
required to re-stabilize the system. The distinguished mean
bundle and software process repair times, measured during
the controlled rejuvenation of the critical RAFT component
sal-distributed-datastore and the ODL’s controller process,
ticked at 182.9ms and 26.9s respectively, far below the 3
minute recovery intervals previously proposed in literature
[28], [30]. The measured recovery time purposely does not
include the time needed to re-include the recovered node in
the RAFT cluster, since this is modeled as a separate non-
deterministic process in our SANs. The bundle and process
reboots took place inside a dedicated ODL VM that was part
of a bigger ODL controller cluster, virtualized on a modern
Intel Xeon-based server, with each of the ODL VMs assigned
4 vCores and 8 GB of DDR4 memory. ODL was loading the
OSGi bundles available in the OpenFlowPlugin and Controller
projects and had the Clustering component enabled.
TABLE II
SAN MODEL PARAMETERS USED IN OUR SOLUTIONS.
Parameter Intensity Unit Meaning
TA 1 [ms] Application handling time
TC 1 [ms] Data-store commit delay
1/λf 225 [ms] Mean follower timeout
1/λca 225 [ms] Mean candidate timeout
TCL 50 [ms] Client timeout
TR(TMworst ) 10 [ms] Worst-case replica-leader delay
TMbest 5 [ms] Best-case majority-leader delay
TCR 1 [ms] Delay client-to-replica
NF 1..C N/A Controller failure count
1/λFH 6 [months] Hardware failure rate
1/λFS 1 [week] Software failure rate
1/λFSi
30/#F [ms] Software failure rate (injected)
1/λRH 12 [h] Hardware repair rate
1/λd ∞ [h] Critical data plane failure rate
1/λRS 3 [minutes] Bundle and process repair rate
1/λRSbw 182.9 [ms] (Watchdog) Bundle repair rate
1/λRSpw 26.9 [s] (Watchdog) Process repair rate
Es 20 N/A Erlang approximation stages
RM 10 N/A Max. inconsistent RAFT terms
C. On parameter selection
To evaluate the expected response time metrics of various
cluster configurations, we vary the SDN cluster size and
hence the number of controller replicas that take part in the
RAFT algorithm as per Table II. The generalized long-term
software and hardware failure rates, as well as the hardware
repair rates are taken from Liu et al. [29]. As discussed in
Subsection III-B, to allow for granular worst-case response
time analysis, we model single and correlated failure injections
with varying number of failures, where following a failure, a
replica is temporarily excluded from the cluster until recov-
ered. To depict the benefits of failure source differentiation
and the proposed watchdog mechanism, we distinguish mixed
and software-only failures, and vary the number of failure
injections between 1 and bC/2c + 1 (majority nodes down)
controller failures. The fact that the process of uniformization
may only be applied to exponentially distributed transition
rates makes our estimations slightly pessimistic. Thus at the
cost of the generated Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC)
state size and required solving time, we approximate every
deterministic message delay and timeout and minimize the
total distribution variance using a 20-stage Erlang distribution.
V. RESULTS OF OUR ANALYTICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we present the results of the analytical eval-
uations for various SDN cluster sizes and arbitrary numbers of
injected failures. We emphasize the benefits of a fast recovery
mechanism for the experienced worst-case response time of
an SDN cluster prone to software failures, and visualize its
advantages for the long-term system availability. Finally, we
discuss the complexity properties of our approach.
A. Response Time Analysis
When a single random-role controller from the SDN cluster
fails as a result of a hardware, process or bundle failure (each
being equally probable), deploying a larger number of SDN
controller replicas ensures an overall lower expected response
time (see Fig. 7). This is related to the probability of a leader
being injected with a failure, hence necessitating a leader re-
election to move forward the state. The probability of a leader
failure becomes increasingly lower when larger clusters are
deployed (as explained in Subsection III-B).
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Fig. 7. Varying probability of an event being successfully handled in a given
time period t for different SDN controller cluster sizes C. The probability of
the RAFT leader failing is inversely proportional to the cluster size.
Next, we evaluate the probability of meeting an event
handling deadline when the majority of nodes in the cluster
have failed. The expected response times where mixed hard-
ware and software failures, as well as exclusively bundle-level
failures may occur, are depicted with and without the watchdog
(WD) mechanism enabled in Fig. 8a and 8b, respectively.
The watchdog mechanism enables faster recovery of replicas
and hence faster repeated processing of an event in the case
of leader and follower majority failures. An SDN cluster
equipped with the watchdog mechanism on average processes
the events faster and with a higher probability than the one
without. Especially when simultaneous hardware failures are
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improbable and software failures are typical, the fast software
recovery provides obvious response-time benefits (Fig. 8b).
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(a) Resulting response time assuming an occurrence of NF combined correlated
hardware and software (process, bundle) failures. All three types of failures are
injected with equal probability.
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(b) Resulting response time assuming NF bundle-only failures. The watchdog
mechanism will guarantee a timely repair and inclusion of the recovered RAFT
node in the cluster.
Fig. 8. Probability of receiving an event response during an observation
window, assuming a simultaneous occurrence of (a) NF mixed and (b)
NF software-bundle only controller failures in a cluster comprised of C
controllers. The failures are injected at rate NF · 0.0333 (all correlated NF
failures are thus expected to be injected by time point t = 30ms).
Fig. 9 depicts the effect of the consecutive failures on
the experienced response time in a 7-node controller cluster.
If the majority nodes remain available after each individual
failure, the time to respond is governed by the case where
a cluster leader fails and a new leader election procedure
is automatically initiated. There is no noticeable difference
in the convergence time regardless of the (non-)usage of the
watchdog mechanism in this particular case. The lower the
maximum number of induced failures induced, slightly shorter
is the expected response time. This may be related to the
fact that the follower timeouts are exponentially distributed,
hence a higher number of active nodes that time out after a
leader failure leads to an overall lower expected time to select
a candidate and repair the cluster.
B. Cluster Availability
Next, we emphasize the long-term advantage of an SDN
controller bundle/process watchdog mechanism by evaluat-
ing the availability of a 3-node cluster configuration over
an observation period of 1000 hours. Fig. 10 depicts the
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Fig. 9. Resulting response time assuming an occurrence of 1 ≤ NF ≤
(bC/2c + 1) controller failures in a 7-node controller cluster. The response
time is governed by the duration of the leader election procedure. When the
majority of controllers are unavailable, the usage of the watchdog mechanism
(dashed) leads to important benefits w.r.t. expected worst-case response time.
unavailability of a 3-node controller cluster setup. We define
the unavailability measure as the probability of encountering
an unavailable cluster of controllers at any time instant t as
PCU (t) = 1 − PCA(t). Here PCA(t) represents the proba-
bility of encountering a system in a state where the RAFT
leader and the majority of RAFT followers are available and
have converged their leader-election processes. Software and
hardware failures are modeled using the long-term exponen-
tial hardware and software failure rates presented in Table
II. The approximated unavailability measure saturates after
∼85 hours, which is an expected mean failure time for the
combined software failures at bundle and process level, given
the individual exponentially distributed failures with a mean of
1 week (∼170 hours) for individual arrivals. We consider the
process and bundle failure arrivals as two independent Poisson
processes with variably configured rates. Hence, merging the
two independent processes with equal arrival rates results in
an approximately halved inter-arrival time between software
failures. The usage of a watchdog that proactively rejuvenates
a system after a software failure leads to a shorter overall
experienced downtime, and hence a lower expected RAFT
cluster unavailability in the long-term. Configurations with
five or more replicas guarantee a negligible unavailability of
< 1e−9 and are hence not included in the figure.
C. Model Complexity and Solve Time
Compared to the manual Markov Chain modeling, SANs
allow for more compact modeling of complex scenarios.
Analytically, both options need to solve the same CTMC
and have to deal with an exponential increase in model
size which may result in inefficient or intractable analytical
solutions when complex models are concerned [31], [32]. The
model complexity dictates both the amount of computational
resources and the time required to solve the model.
Fig. 11 depicts the state space sizes of the generated
CTMCs. The generated state space is used by the transient
solver to find the transient solutions for short-term (NF lower
than C) and long term (NF considers up to C failures)
numerical analysis. The model complexity increases with the
number of possible combinations the system may occupy. For
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Fig. 10. Transient analysis of the SDN controller cluster unavailability over
a period of 1000 hours. The cluster size of exactly three controllers was
considered in the transient analysis. As expected, the inclusion of a liveness
guard mechanism results in a lower overall expected unavailability. SDN
controller clusters that include five or a higher number of replicas per cluster
have shown to posses negligible availability concerns. This confirms the claims
made in [28], where authors discuss the minimal effect of long-term failure
rates on the experienced downtime of an SDN control plane.
short-term response time analysis we limit the complexity of
the model by considering only the injected correlated failures -
this is realistic as only a very short time period (1s < x < 2s)
is considered (see Figures 7 and 8). For long-term analysis,
additional system states, where more than just the majority
of nodes may fail could be of interest (consider Fig. 10).
Fig. 11 shows the CTMC state space sizes for the cluster
configurations up to C = 19. We observe that, for some
parametrizations, the compiled state space size grows expo-
nentially with the number of controller replicas. The number
of possible failure injections dictates the number of generated
unique combinations. For the most accurate setting of the
ES = 20 (20 Erlang stages, see Subsection IV-C) and cluster
sizes of 17 and more replicas, we have encountered memory
handling limitations in the flat state space generator in Mo¨bius.
Namely, if the solution should cover for all theoretically
possible system combinations, i.e. when failure of every single
node should be considered, the solution space eventually grows
to an intractable amount of states for very large cluster sizes.
To cater for the scalability of our solution when analyzing
large control planes, we propose three options:
1) State space largeness avoidance by applying a scenario-
based approach to the worst-case modeling. For exam-
ple, one could consider a limited number of maximum
failure injections. By limiting the number of maximum
failure injections to NF = bC/2c+1, large-scale clusters
can be analyzed successfully (see Fig. 11).
2) State space largeness avoidance by trading solution
accuracy, e.g. by manipulation of the Erlang stages used
for the approximation of the deterministic transitions.
3) Faster convergence of the transient solver by raising the
error tolerance of the uniformization (see Equation 1).
For completeness, we also evaluate the second option by
varying the Erlang stage parametrization. We take note of the
effect on the overall result accuracy for the transient analysis of
a 7-node cluster. Fig. 12 depicts the inaccuracy of the latency
bound introduced by lowering the number of Erlang stages
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Fig. 11. Size of the CTMC state space generated using the SAN models
and parameters discussed in Sections III and IV, respectively. The lower the
number of controller failures of interest (i.e. where NF < C), the smaller the
resulting CTMC state space size. If the possibility of an eventual occurrence
of failures in all nodes is assumed, the state space grows correspondingly,
reaching up to 107 possible state space combinations with controller cluster
size set to C = 13 and the maximum accuracy ES = 15. Striped bars
represent the unsuccessful CTMC compilations where the flat state space
generator fails to compile the state space. However, by considering a lower
number of Erlang approximation stages ES , C = 19 and more controller
replicas can be handled with a limited inaccuracy (see Fig. 12). Similarly, a
focused assumption on the maximum number of possible failure occurrences
helps the scalability of the solution (where max(NF ) < C).
from EShigh = 20 to ESlow ∈ {5, 10, 15}. At ES = 5,
the generated state space size is decreased by a magnitude
(see Fig. 11) and is hence, in addition to the first option, an
effective method of deploying our models in a scalable manner.
From this study, we conclude that the state space generation
process is scalable as long as the accuracy and failure injection
parameters are selected carefully for the use case at hand.
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Fig. 12. Inaccuracies stemming from a decreased number of Erlang stages
ES used in the approximation of deterministic transitions are negligible.
Inaccurate approximation of a deterministic distribution lead to a higher
variance for the random variable describing the failure arrivals. Hence, for
small ES the solver estimates a more relaxed (thus more pessimistic) latency
bound.
We next consider the performance overhead of the state
space generation in our approach. Fig. 13 shows how the
scenario where max(NF ) = C with C = 19 and ES = 5
results in a tolerable ∼ 103 seconds solving period.
Fig. 14 depicts the computation time to solve the presented
SANs. The duration of the solution computation of SAN
will vary depending on the model complexity (state space
size), the definition of the observed performance variable
(reward function and the number and granularity of time
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Fig. 13. Overhead of the CTMC compilation for varying cluster sizes C,
failure injection counts max(NF ) and Erlang parameterizations ES . While
very accurate and large-scale combinations may lead to intractable solutions,
feasible solutions can be presented even for the complex deployments of
C = 19 controllers with various degrees of accuracy and all max(NF )
combinations.
measurements), as well as the required accuracy and model
stiffness (the range of the expected action completion times)
[33]. In the Mo¨bius modeling tool, the accuracy of the transient
solver indicates the degree of accuracy that the user wishes in
terms of the number of decimal places. The solver execution
times depicted in Fig. 14 were observed for the accuracy
parameter set to 9 and an observation window of 1 second
(1000 data points). The largest generated state space for the
purpose of modeling the largest cluster size necessarily leads
to the longest solution computation times. For the analysis
scenarios described here, these computation times are feasible.
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Fig. 14. Computation time of the instant of time [22] transient solutions
for the state space sizes depicted in Fig. 11. The solution covers the target
observation interval of 1 second at millisecond resolution - hence the transient
solver has computed the solutions for 1000 time-points. The computations
were executed on a commodity hardware equipped with a modern AMD
processor and 32GB of DDR4 memory. The required computation overhead
for the numerical solution is feasible for a short-term response time study.
VI. RELATED WORK
In state of the art literature, availability and overhead mod-
eling of SDN has recently started to gain traction. In [28], the
authors investigate the impact of operational and management
failures on the availability in SDNs. They focus on the long-
term availability impact of adding additional controllers, but
do not include any response time analysis nor consider the
impact of controller synchronization at micro-scale.
Tuncer et al. [34] enhance a controller placement heuristic
to cater for the optimality of the controller-network device
cluster unbalance. Given an arbitrary network topology, their
objective is to compute the number of controllers and the
fitting placement, as well as to declare the controller-device
assignments when considering a distance (e.g. delay) con-
straint. While the controller-switch assignment was specifi-
cally targeted in their work, the same solution could be applied
to planning an efficient controller cluster configuration. The
problem we solve is complementary to this, since we allow
for analyzing any given SDN cluster with regards to its worst-
case control plane performance at runtime.
Muqaddas et al. [5], [35] investigate the load overhead
of the intra-cluster communication in a 2- and 3-controller
ONOS cluster. They propose a model to quantify the traffic
exchanged among the controllers and express it as a function
of the network topology. They did not consider the effect of
the transient failures on the response time and availability.
In [36], Zhang et al. describe the single-data ownership
organizational model implemented by the RAFT algorithm
and propose an estimation formula for approximating of the
flow setup time in a distributed SDN controller cluster. Their
estimation is however fairly simplistic as it models only the
average case. The worst-case estimations were not considered.
Ongaro [24] and Howard et al. [14] provide initial perfor-
mance evaluations of the RAFT consensus algorithm. Howard
et al. [14] further implement an event-driven framework for
prototyping of RAFT using experimental topologies. Contrary
to the analytical approach presented in our work, their per-
formance evaluation of RAFT is based on a limited number
of repeated experiments and focuses on evaluating the RAFT
leader re-election procedure following a failure. Unfortunately,
these works do not provide a good understanding of how the
overall system response time is affected after a failure.
In two experiment-based studies, Suh et al. [15], [16]
measure the throughput and the recovery time of a RAFT-
enabled SDN controller cluster with 1, 3 and 5 replicas. They
put special focus on the effect of φ accrual failure detector
[37] on the resulting performance footprint. The authors
deduce that the controller failover time increases as the value φ
increases. With higher φ, the OpenDaylight cluster becomes
more conservative in determining a controller failure, hence
in case of failures, using a large φ values will generally lead
to slow failure discovery. Authors varied φ and measured the
lowest recovery time of ∼ 2, 6s, which is a non-satisfying
recovery time for many critical industrial applications. Instead
of using an adaptive scaling factor φ, we rely on a fixed
follower timeout variable with a mean of ∼ 225ms. We
assume that the controller-to-controller delays are bounded and
will hence not exceed this value except in the case where a
controller failure has occurred. This value is recommended
by the authors of the RAFT consensus algorithm, and was
determined to be a good trade-off between the recovery time
and the signaling overhead in their experiments [11].
The introduced watchdog mechanism for fast software sys-
tem recovery relates to the concept of software rejuvenation.
Several works have investigated the phenomenon of ”software
aging” wherein the health of a software system degrades with
time [38], [39]. These papers conclude that a mechanism
which ”rejuvenates” or ”recovers” the software component to
its stable state, would provide long-term benefits in terms of
experienced system availability. In this work, we evaluate the
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benefits of the reactive controller recovery where, following
a detected controller bundle or process failure, the affected
component is reinitialized in order to minimize the downtime.
Machida et al. [40] analyze the completion time of a job
running on a server that is affected by software aging, and
consider the benefit of the preemptive-resume operation, where
a job resumes execution from the point of interruption as
soon as the failed server recovers. Similar to this work, we
investigate the job completion time for a client request, but
we consider a distributed multi-server operation. We focus on
the strategy where, assuming a failure occurs, the request is
handled from the beginning instead of delegating it to the next
server.
Apart from RAFT, Paxos [9] is another influential [8], [41]
consensus algorithm that eventually motivated the develop-
ment of RAFT. Paxos ensures that any two distributed servers
that are part of the same cluster may never disagree about
the value of a particular update, for any applied update
in the update history. In its optimizations, its performance
is comparable to RAFT, in that, assuming a stable cluster
leadership, committing a cluster-wide update takes a single
round trip in most cases [10]. Multi-Paxos [9], [13] is a
prominent variation of Paxos, that assumes a stable leader for
an infinite number of sequential cluster updates. This allows
for one-round-trip delay as the first phase of Paxos becomes
unnecessary for the majority of updates. In [42] the authors
evaluate an implementation of Multi-Paxos and conclude that
the overall performance of Multi-Paxos is limited by the
slowest node in the fastest cluster majority. This is a valid
observation for any quorum-based consensus algorithm, hence
we distinguish the leader failures as critical for our analysis.
To minimize the effect of single-leader failure and maximize
the load balancing of requests, Mencius [43] proposes a
round-robin-based update-handling by multiple leaders in a
Paxos cluster. While it enables higher throughput in the stable
case, the cluster will always run at the speed of the slowest
elected leader as the new updates may be dependant on
previous updates that are assigned to be handled by the slow
node. EPaxos [10] is a recent leader-less take on Paxos that
tries to circumvent these issues. It keeps track of the ordering
and mutual dependencies between the client-initiated updates.
Hence, it is able to parallelize multiple update instances when
no collisions between concurrent client updates are expected.
Like RAFT, it requires a single round-trip in most cases to
commit a state update, and two round-trips if dependency
conflicts arise. Contrary to RAFT and other leader-based Paxos
variations, the response time in an EPaxos cluster does not
suffer from unstable leaders since the clients may always
fall-back to any remaining live leader replica. However, the
algorithm adds additional complexity in state-keeping and log
compaction tasks because of the added dependency trees.
Since all available SDN cluster implementations focus on
a single master for any switch in its administrative domain
at runtime, we put focus on the evaluation of a single-
leader RAFT-based cluster and consider its direct comparison
with multi-leader EPaxos [10] and eventually consistent ap-
proaches [4], [44] as future work.
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
SDN enables the necessary control plane robustness by
controller clustering and state replication. However, this repli-
cation incurs additional performance overhead. Indeed, it is
not always clear which particular cluster configuration would
best suit the application and network configuration at hand.
Existing performance studies of distributed SDN control plane
neglect the cluster’s response time and availability metrics.
Hence, we hereby propose the usage of Stochastic Activity
Networks (SANs) for modeling and numerical evaluation
of distributed SDN clusters. We put special focus on the
practically relevant distributed consensus algorithm RAFT, but
generalize our model to be applicable to similar Paxos variants
(e.g., Multi-Paxos). RAFT is implemented in two dominant
open-source SDN platforms and is of practical relevance for
performance analysis of the distributed SDN control plane.
We introduce and discuss the SAN-based models for response
time and availability evaluation, and include a failure injection
model for evaluation of the two metrics under the effect of
an arbitrary number of correlated controller failures. Using
transient solver methods, we are able to provide a probabilistic
guarantee on the event handling response times and numeri-
cally evaluate the availability property of arbitrary SDN cluster
configurations. We have shown that, assuming a balanced
distribution of controllers in the network w.r.t. the controller-
to-controller delays, larger clusters provide lower worst-case
response times and higher system availability. With the help
of analytical modeling, the evaluation and optimization of
cluster configurations, in order to determine the best suited
configuration for the network at hand, becomes possible
without costly hardware setups for experimental evaluation or
lengthy simulation runs. Analytical modeling further provides
for corner case inclusion and tighter stochastic guarantees than
possible using experimental sampling.
Finally, we have proposed the watchdog mechanism for
fast recovery from software failures in a distributed SDN
controller setting. Using transient solvers, we have proven its
benefits on the short-term response time and the long-term
availability properties of a controller cluster. The solutions to
our models are computationally feasible for both the typical
(3-5 controllers), and very complex clusters (∼20 controllers).
Extensions to support the novel leaderless Paxos variants,
such as EPaxos, require significant changes in the models
used and are thus considered as future work. Furthermore, we
provide the response time metrics for a model that assumes
an accumulated distribution of RAFT state updates in the
latency- and throughput-optimized, batched mode. Extending
the proposed model to support a sequential distribution of
updates at high scale is non-trivial using SAN-based mod-
eling, because of the added state size complexity. Supporting
the queueing behavior when handling client-generated events
requires inclusion of additional concepts from classic queueing
theory or network calculus for practical value.
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